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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SAM PINO, JEANNE R.
THOMAS, TODD PALMER, and
JODIE PALMER
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
CASE NO. 20160294-CA
ENTITY #4812420-0140,
Commonly known as The Well
Corporation, a Utah nonprofit
Corporation
Defendant/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE UTAH THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, HONORABLE ROBERT FAUST

INTRODUCTION
Appellants reply as follows to Appellee's ("TWC 2000") Brief filed in this matter.

ARGUMENT

I.

No Conflict Exists Between Applicable Statutes and Articles of Incorporation.
TWC 2000 argues that a conflict exists between applicable statutes and TWC

2000's Articles oflncorporation, and that when a conflict exists between corporate

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
1
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

statutory provisions and a corporation's Articles, the statutory provisions govern.
Appellee's Brief, p. 22 . The asserted conflict between governing statutory provisions
and TWC's Articles does not exist.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-6a-1302(2)(c) does authorize a dissolved nonprofit
corporation to make distributions to a replacement nonprofit corporation. If only that
subsection of the statute is read and applied, then the statute would conflict with TWC
2000's Articles of Incorporation, which require that, upon dissolution, its assets are to be
distributed to its shareholders.
When 1302 is read as a whole, however, no conflict exists because subsection 2(b)
of the statute authorizes distribution of assets of a dissolved nonprofit corporation to its
shareholders. Nothing in this statute requires application of subsection (2)(c) over
subsection (2)(b). As explained in Appellants' initial brief, the provision in the Articles
oflncorporation requiring distribution of assets upon dissolution to TWC 2000's
shareholders is a term in a contract between TWC 2000 and its shareholders, which
contract cop.sists of both the Articles and the statute, and all provisions of the contract are
to be given effect when possible.
Only if subsection (2)(b) was not included in the statute would the statute conflict
with the Articles because then subsection (2)(c) would be the only applicable alternative.
Because subsection (2)(b) is in the statute, it is possible to give effect to the Articles'
requirement of distribution to shareholders, and, if done, no conflict exists between the
Articles and the statute, and this term of the contract is given effect.
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II.
~

Rules of Statutory Interpretation Do Not Preclude the Interpretation of
Applicable Statutes in the Manner Urged by Appellants.
TWC 2000 argues that Appellants' position in this matter is contrary to the below

discussed rules of statutory interpretation. While such rules exist, they do not preclude
Appellants' interpretation of the relevant statutes.
Il(a). Legislative Intent and Purpose.
TWC 2000 states that a primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to
the intent of the legislature as evidenced by a statute's language and in light of the
purpose of the statute. Appellee's Brief, p. 23. It argues that the legislature amended
1302 to include subsection (2)( c) with the intent of allowing the business of dissolved
water corporations to continue after dissolution by transferring their assets to
corporations organized to receive the assets and to continue the business. Even so,
subsection (2)(b) remains in the statute and allows distribution of a dissolved
corporation's assets to be distributed to its shareholders Therefore, it cannot logically be
said that the legislature intended that assets cannot be distributed to a dissolved nonprofit
corporation's shareholders when it put that alternative in the same statute as the
alternative espoused by TWC 2000.
Neither can it be said that either of these two alternatives is to be preferred over
Gi

the other when the statutory language does not indicate any preference. In fact, TWC
2000 states that omissions in statutory language are deemed by courts to be intentional by
the legislature, Appellee's Brief, p. 23. Therefore, the omission of a preference of one
alternative over the other must be deemed to have been intentional by the legislature.
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Further, the language of a statute is primary, and governing law is determined by
the statutory text itself unless there is ambiguity in the text. See Craig, et. al. v. Provo
City, 2016 UT 40,

,r 29.

The Court in Craig stated that:

'[w]e may resolve ambiguities in the text of the law by reference to
reliable indications of legislative understanding or intent (as in
legislative history). But the invocation of extra-statutory intent as a matter
overriding the statutory text gets things backwards.' 'The statutory language
is primary. (citations omitted).
Id.

We have said that it is fallacy to suppose 'that statutory provisions are
addressed only to the specific problems giving rise to their adoption.'
. . . So a court cannot reliably discern legislative intent of a particular
matter by reasoning generally from a statement (even an accurate one)
of a broad statutory purpose. Such an approach will often distort the
the intent of the legislature as reflected in the law-the text-because
a statement of legislative purpose often paints only a part of the picture.
Id. at if 30.

Section 1302 is not ambiguous. Its text clearly allows for two alternatives for
distribution of a dissolved nonprofit corporation's assets, and its text does not prefer one
alternative over the other. Nevertheless, a determination must be made in this case, and
that determination is supplied by giving effect to all terms of the applicable contract
between TWC 2000 and its shareholders.

Il(b). Harmonizing Statutory Provisions and Contract Provisions.
TWC 2000 argues that subsection 1302(3) allows authorized officers and directors
of a dissolved nonprofit corporations to make distributions of the corporation's assets.
Appellee's Brief, 24. Appellants are not contesting that officers and directors may make
distributions authorized under 1302(3 ). That subsection, however, neither mandates nor
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provides guidance as to which distribution alternative under subsection 1302(2) should be
utilized by officers and directors.
TWC 2000 argues that Utah Code Ann.§ 16-6a-1302 and§ 16-6a-1405(1)(c)
~

must be harmonized. Id. Section 16-6a- l 405 limits a dissolved corporation's post
dissolution activities to those of winding up and liquidating its affairs, including, in
subsection (I)( c ), "transferring, subject to any contractual or legal requirements, its assets
as provided in or authorized by its Articles oflncorporation or Bylaws." Id. (emphasis

added). TWC 2000 argues that hannonizing these two statutes results in officers and
@

directors having a choice between the alternative distributions of assets contained in
1302(2). This does not mean, however, that officers and directors can exercise that

~

choice to cause a corporation to act contrary to its governing documents and contracts.
Under subsection 1405(1)(c), as quoted above, officers' and directors' actions in winding
up and liquidating a dissolved nonprofit corporation are limited by its Articles of
Incorporation and by any contractual or legal requirements.
TWC 2000's argument that Appellants' position would render 1302(2)(c)

@

superfluous because of the existence of 1405(1)(c), See Appellee's Brief: p. 25, does not
follow. Neither statute renders the other superfluous, and each is left applicable to
differing fact situations. There are undoubtedly situations in which a dissolved
corporation's Articles do not require distribution upon dissolution to the corporations'
shareholders. In those situations, 1302(2)(c) could be applicable. Where a corporations'

@

Articles do require distribution to shareholders upon dissolution, 1302(2)(b) and
1405(l){c) would be applicable. TWC 2000's position does not harmonize the two
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

statutes. Rather, it gives priority to section 1302(2)(c) over 1302(2)(b) and the
limitations of section 1405( 1)( c) subjecting post dissolution distributions to a
corporation's Articles oflncorporation and contracts. Also, if Appellants' position
renders the 1302(2)(c) alternative superfluous, as argued by TWC 2000, then the latter's
position renders the 1302(2)(b) alternative superfluous. Neither such position is valid.
In any event, attempting to harmonize just 1302 and 1405 leaves out an essential
ingredient. The legally imposed contract between the corporation and its shareholders
needs to be added to the mix. When that occurs, section 1302's authorization of different
distribution alternatives is limited by 1405(l)(c)'s restriction of choice under 1302 to one
that is in accordance with Articles of Incorporation and contractual requirements. Then,
as required in the applicable contract, the contract can be given effect by implementation
of the requirement in the Articles to distribute TWC 2000's assets to the corporation's
shareholders.

II(c). Statutory Omissions.
TWC 2000 argues that 1302 is not subject to inconsistent language in a
corporation's governing documents because the legislature purposefully omitted putting
language in 1302 that makes it subject to the governing documents and that other sections
of the nonprofit corporation code contain such language. Appellee's Brief, p. 25. This
argument assumes that TWC 2000's Articles requiring assets, upon dissolution, to be
distributed to shareholders is inconsistent with 1302. A plain reading of 1302 does not
support this assumption interring meaning into 1302 which is not expressed in its
language. Further, it cannot be said that language in the Articles requiring distribution of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
6
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assets to shareholders is inconsistent with I 302 when l 302(2)(b) expressly authorizes an
alternative of distribution of assets to shareholders.
Finally, TWC 2000's argument overlooks the fact that the legislature specifically
required Articles of Incorporation to set forth "provisions not inconsistent with law
regarding the distribution of assets on dissolution." Utah Code Ann. § 16-6a-202(g). The
Articles provision in question is not inconsistent with law for all of the reasons argued.

III.

Notice of Shareholders' Meeting and Ratification Vote Remain Deficient.

TWC 2000 argues that the notice of shareholders' meeting, at which transfer of
assets ofTWC 2000 to TWC to 2013 was ratified, was adequate because that transaction
was a distribution of assets, and under Utah Code Ann. § 16-6(a)-1202(8), a distribution
transaction is governed by 1302, and 1302 does not contain any notice requirements.
Appellee's Brief, p.p. 37-8. Such argument fails to deal with Utah Code Ann.§ 704 that
requires all notices of shareholders meetings to be fair and reasonable.
Even though subsection 1202(8) states that a transaction that constitutes a
distribution is governed by part 13, it does not state that part 13 governs notices of
@

shareholders' meetings. Neither 1202 nor part 13 deal with notices of shareholders'
meetings. That subject is governed by 704, and it is the applicable code section
governing notices of shareholders' meetings. Also, subsection 1202(8) can only deflect
to part 13 provisions that are contained in 1202. Because 1202 contains no notice
provisions, there were no notice provisions to be deflected to part 13.
Section 704 requires a notice of shareholders' meeting to be fair and reasonable.
To be fair and reasonable, 704(3)(b) requires that the notice must include a description of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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any matter for which shareholder's approval is sought under section 1202.
( 1)

A nonprofit corporation shall give to each member entitled to vote
at the meeting notice consistent with its bylaws of meetings of
members in a fair and reasonable manner.

(3)

Notice is fair and reasonable if:

(b)

the notice of an annual or regular meeting includes a description of
any matter or matters ... :
~

(ii)

for which the members' approval is sought under Sections
... 16-6a-1202 ....

Utah Code Ann. § 704.
Subsection 1202(1)(a), allows non-regular course of business distributions of all or
substantially all assets of a nonprofit corporation if that is recommended by the board of
directors and approved by shareholders. The notice in question did not contain a
description of the board's action in distributing all of TWC 2000's assets to TWC 2013
even though approval or ratification of that action was being sought at the shareholders'
meeting. Therefore, the notice was not fair and reasonable as required by 704.
The matter could have been easily and quickly resolved by just calling another
shareholders' meeting and by giving proper notice that a ratification would be
recommended and voted on at the meeting. This was suggested by the district court
judge. See R. 800.
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IV.

Ratification Vote is Void and Not Ratified.

Appellants have argued that purported ratification of the non-regular course of
business transfer of TWC 2000 assets to TWC 2013 is invalid because no directors'
@

resolution was adopted recommending to shareholders transfer of assets as required by
subsection 1202(1)(a) and Article III(4) ofTWC 2000's Articles oflncorporation. TWC
2000 responds that such deficiency does not render the boards' failure void but only
voidable and subject to ratification by the shareholders. Appellees' Brief, p. 29.
Additionally, it argues that a resolution was submitted to shareholders at the September 6,
2014 shareholders' meeting. Attachment 1 to the minutes of that meeting, R. 489,
reflects that any ratification resolution that was voted upon was a shareholder's
resolution, not a board resolution.
The language of Article III(4) ofTWC 2000's Articles and 1202(1)(a) reflect an
intent that the board adopt its own resolution, recommend that resolution to shareholders,
and direct that the resolution be submitted to a shareholder vote at a shareholders'
meeting after notice of such a meeting is given. This sequence did not occur, and the

@

board of directors now seeks to justify its failed procedure by arguing that a shareholders'
resolution voted upon at an improperly noticed shareholders' meeting does what the
board was required to do but did not do. Further, the meeting notice did not advise any
shareholder that ratification action would be proposed and submitted to a shareholders'
vote at the meeting.
Those that attended the meeting got the benefit of what the directors discussed and
proposed regarding ratification. A reasonable assumption can be made that other
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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shareholders would have attended the meeting if they had been given notice and knew
that a ratification vote would occur at the meeting. Just the amount of litigation related
to this matter reflects disagreement among shareholders about what has occurred.
Attendance and discussion by additional shareholders may have changed the outcome of
the vote. Under 704, it is fair and reasonable that all shareholders should have had
advance notice that the directors planned to call for a ratification vote at the meeting.
Because the directors did not adopt the required resolution and recommend it to all
shareholders prior to the meeting, and because they did not provide notice of the
resolution and its recommendation in the meeting notice and that a ratification vote
would be called for at the meeting, the ratification should be void and not ratified.

V.

The District Court Could Have Removed TWC's 2000's Pending Status and
Ruled That it Was Irrevocably Dissolved.
TWC 2000 asserts that the district court could not remove the pending status of

TWC 2000 's existence and order that it is irrevocably dissolved because only the State
Division of Corporations can do that and because the Division was not joined as a party
in this matter under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellee's Brief, p.
30.
Whether removal ofTWC 2000's pending status can be done only by the Division
is not an issue. Appellants simply wanted the district court to confirm TWC 2000's
dissolution under applicable statutes and, as a result, remove or order removal of its
pending status. The Division invited such an order when it stated "[t]he pending status
will only be removed by court order, authenticated signatures to an agreement, or binding

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

arbitration." R. 446. In addition, Rule 19 only requires joinder of a party if in its absence
complete relief cannot be awarded among other parties or if not joining a party would
impede its ability to protect its interest or leave other parties subject to multiple or
<@

inconsistent obligations. URCP 19. These conditions do not exist, and it is assumed that
because the Division invited such an order it would honor it if it comes. If it does not,
remedies are available against the Division.
CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the district court decision and declare TWC 2000 to
have been irrevocably dissolved and that its assets should be distributed to its
shareholders.
Dated March 31, 2017.
THOMAS N. CROWTHER, P.C.
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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